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Abstract We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of
central-bank council members is socially beneficial when the public is unsure about
the efficiency of central bankers and central bankers are angling for re-appointment.
We show that publication is initially harmful since it creates a conflict between socially
desirable and individually optimal behavior for somewhat less efficient central bank-
ers. However, after re-appointment, losses will be lower when voting records are pub-
lished since the government can distinguish highly efficient from less efficient central
bankers more easily and can make central bankers individually accountable. In our
model, the negative effects of voting transparency dominate, and expected overall
losses are always larger when voting records are published.
1 Introduction
The question of transparency in connection with central banks, and for the Federal
Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) in particular, has triggered a lively
discussion among academics and policy-makers. How transparent should they be?
And what does transparency actually mean in this context?
Whether the publication of voting records is socially beneficial is one of the most
controversial issues. The publication of voting records is advocated by Buiter (1999),
among others. In general, he argues that individual accountability produces better
H. Gersbach
CER-ETH, Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, ZUE D7, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: hgersbach@ethz.ch
V. Hahn (B)
CER-ETH, Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, ZUE D13, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: vhahn@ethz.ch
123
656 H. Gersbach, V. Hahn
results than collective responsibility. Under individual accountability, members who
find themselves in the minority would be able to publicly argue their case for a different
monetary policy. Additionally, individual members’ competence can only be assessed
with a track record of individual votes. This is important for re-appointments and for
departing members’ prospects of employment in other responsible positions. On the
other hand, Issing (1999), among others, has expressed concern about the pressure
that national authorities would exert on the members of the ECB council if individual
voting behavior were published. This argument is also developed in a formal model
by Gersbach and Hahn (2005).
Our paper also contributes to an emerging theoretical literature on the optimal
design of independent central bank boards with several members appointed by the
government. Waller and Walsh (1996) provide a comprehensive account of how central
bank independence can be characterized in terms of competitiveness, partisanship, and
term length. Waller (2000) shows that a group of politically appointed central bank-
ers can produce substantial policy smoothing and low policy uncertainty. Our paper
is complementary to this literature as we focus on whether the votes of individual
central bankers for a given design of the board should be made transparent to the
political authorities that appoint central bankers.
We build a simple model of collective decision-making among central bankers
who are motivated by holding office and thus by their reputation as competent central
bankers. In this respect, our model belongs to the literature on career concerns, which
were first modeled formally by Holmström (1982). In a technical sense, our paper
deals with agents who have private information about an unknown state of the world
and are concerned about their career. The literature developed by Scharfstein and
Stein (1990), Trueman (1994), and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001) is concerned with
herding problems when experts suppress their private information in order to appear
well-informed. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001), in particular, develop a theory about
which experts should speak first in order to achieve optimal information aggregation
in debates. We complement this literature by considering how reputation-building is
affected by the transparency regime.1
To our knowledge, there exist only a few theoretical papers dealing with the
publication of voting records and the minutes of central-bank council meetings.2
In a recent contribution, Levy (2007) examines transparency and different voting
rules for a committee of three experts. She finds that transparency may induce group
members to comply with pre-existing biases.3 Sibert (2003) presents an interest-
ing model of reputation-building in monetary policy committees. She examines the
incentives for individual central bankers to build a reputation for being tough on
1 Visser and Swank (2007) develop an interesting model where experts derive utility from being perceived
as competent and from policy outcomes. Their focus, however, is not on transparency.
2 A survey of the literature on central-bank transparency can be found in Geraats (2002), Hahn (2002),
and in the general assessment of central-bank transparency by Blinder et al. (2001). The earliest model
that involves a socially detrimental effect of transparency was proposed by Gersbach (1998). Fujiki (2005)
presents an interesting overview of the literature on monetary policy committees.
3 Her model differs from ours in at least two respects. First, she does not consider re-appointment
explicitly, so the beneficial effect of transparency identified in our paper does not occur. Second, all members
are specialized, i.e., they receive signals about uncorrelated random variables.
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inflation when they are part of a committee. She argues that transparency might
improve reputation-building. In our paper, we compare the relative merits of
individual and collective reputation-building when reputation has to do with the com-
petence of central bankers. Under transparency, re-appointment decisions depend on
the individual reputation for being competent, whereas under opacity re-appointment
is contingent on collective reputation only.4
Gersbach and Hahn (2004) show that the publication of voting records may be
beneficial if central bankers pursue different objectives. Their findings, however, are
reversed in the case of a monetary union, where central bankers may pursue the interests
of their national countries (see Gersbach and Hahn 2005). In this case, transparency
may lead to increased national outsider pressure and induce central bankers to behave
in the interests of their own governments. This may be detrimental for the monetary
union.
In our paper, we identify the costs and benefits of voting transparency in a simple
model in which central bankers differ in their efficiency at identifying
which monetary policy decision would lead to socially optimal outcomes. Of course,
one might argue that all central-bank council members are provided with the same
data by their staff, so differences in knowledge would be irrelevant. Nevertheless,
monetary policy is sometimes “as much art as science,” as the former vice-president
of the Fed, Alan Blinder, put it.5 Therefore it is not implausible to assume that some
central bankers are more proficient than others in the art of judging which interest
rates are appropriate.
While a completely accurate formal description of the discussion among council
members, the exchange of views before formal voting takes place, and the voting
process itself is certainly not feasible, we attempt to capture the basic features of
actual decision-making by introducing a two-stage decision process. Central bankers
may either choose to play an active role in the discussion and in decision-making,
or they may wait and listen to other members’ views before making a decision. We
believe that this two-stage procedure, although definitely a simplification, captures the
essential features of the dynamic process of exchanging views in a monetary policy
committee.6 It is important to note that the two-stage procedure applied in this
paper is able to deliver an efficient aggregation of information. Less efficient members
can wait and listen to the arguments of their more efficient colleagues, and this enables
them to make the best choices possible. In addition, highly efficient central bankers
cannot do better by announcing their views sequentially, as the simultaneous divul-
gence of their private information already amounts to an efficient aggregation of
information.
It is worth noting that in our model the discussion among central bankers and the
voting procedure are not modeled separately. But this may be deemed a desirable
4 Transparency in career concern models has been examined in two other papers. Fingleton and Raith (2005)
show that a principal may prefer agents to bargain behind closed doors, which prevents them from bargain-
ing very aggressively. Prat (2005) examines transparency for a career concern model with one individual
expert.
5 See Blinder (1997), p. 17.
6 Hahn (2007) examines a voting procedure involving more stages.
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feature since, e.g. in the ECB council, decisions are not usually reached by formal
voting. Thus, voting transparency in our model cannot be separated from the publi-
cation of the minutes of the meetings.
We show that transparency yields higher losses in the first period and lower losses
in the second. The intuition runs as follows: the benefits of transparency arise from the
way it enables the government to more easily distinguish the highly efficient from the
somewhat less efficient central bankers. The government can thus improve the overall
competence of the central-bank council over time by re-appointing only manifestly
highly efficient central bankers. But there is a serious disadvantage to transparency.
To avoid being dismissed, less efficient central bankers will try to give the impres-
sion of expertise whenever their individual behavior can be observed.7 Transparency
induces them to play a more active role in decision-making. But since they do not
know whether interest rates should be raised or lowered, the probability of error on
their part is rather high. The likelihood that the central bank will adopt the appro-
priate interest-rate policy decreases, and social losses are higher than they would
be in the absence of transparency since transparency enables less efficient central
bankers to behave more passively and to listen to the arguments of their more profi-
cient colleagues. We show that these costs exceed the benefits of transparency gained
by assembling a highly efficient central-bank council. Hence, overall social losses are
larger under transparency.
We focus on the majority rule, as all major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of
Japan or the Bank of England use majority voting. The “Treaty on European Union”
also stipulates majority voting for the ECB Governing Council. A further interest-
ing research issue for general committee settings is the impact of transparency when
decisions are taken unanimously (see e.g. Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998 or Levy
2007).
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we describe the model. We
introduce assumptions about the re-appointment schemes in Sect. 3. In the subsequent
two sections, the results for the first and the second period are derived. Then we attempt
an overall comparison between transparency and opacity in Sect. 6. Section 7 presents
our major conclusions.
2 Model
We assume that instantaneous social losses in period t are given by (t = 1, 2)
Lt =
{
0 if It = I ∗t
1 if It = I ∗t ,
where It is the instrument chosen by the central bank and I ∗t is the optimal choice of
7 The concern about pressure to appear highly efficient in every decision has also been raised in
private communications with central-bank council members and individuals involved in central-bank
design. Cukierman (2001) has expressed concern that, when votes are published, decisions will depend
more on political and personal considerations and less on professional considerations.
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the instrument.8 Henceforth we will use the term “interest rate” for the instrument.
We normalize the two possible realizations of I ∗t to +1 and −1, respectively. This
simplifies the analysis but is not crucial to our results. In a similar vein, we have also
normalized social losses to 1 if a wrong decision is taken and to 0 if the interest rate
is correct. Both realizations of I ∗t are assumed to be equally likely a priori. We take
up this point again in Sect. 7.
Monetary policy is decided by a central bank committee comprising N members
(N ≥ 1, N odd). A crucial issue is the utility gained by central bankers when in
office. There are two possible motives. Central bankers can be motivated by certain
policies, i.e. they would like to minimize their individual loss function depending only
on inflation and output.9 Alternatively, they may derive additional private benefits from
being a central banker, i.e. from the prestige and satisfaction of work on the council.
Both approaches to the formulation of utilities for central bankers are equally plausible
and give rise to transparency issues. In this paper, we follow the latter approach;
each central banker is assumed to derive large private benefits from being on the
council. The observation that Alan Greenspan agreed to a fifth term of office in 2004,
although he was almost 78 at the time, may indicate that private benefits are high.10
Another piece of anecdotal evidence is the article in the “Economist”, August 4, 2005,
“Fazio’s future”. The then president of the Bank of Italy was reported to “like his job
as boss of the Bank of Italy.” He obstinately resisted mounting pressure to resign as a
consequence of his dubious role in a takeover battle.
A central banker’s losses in period t are given by
LC Bt = Lt − Bt . (1)
Bt denotes private benefits emanating from being a member of the central-bank coun-
cil. These benefits are zero if not a member and large otherwise.
Bt =
{
B if in office
0 otherwise
(2)
For simplicity, these private benefits are assumed to be so large that a central banker has
lexicographical preferences and will maximize his re-appointment probability. Only
if the probability of re-appointment does not depend on his action will he choose the
action that minimizes social losses. However, the equilibrium identified in our paper
also exists if we make the weaker assumption B ≥ 1.
It is obvious that transparency can only have a differential impact if there is some
heterogeneity among central bankers. There are two possible ways for differences
8 In Gersbach and Hahn (2004) we show that this loss function can be derived in a simple aggregate
demand/aggregate supply framework with supply shocks.
9 The case where central bankers want to minimize the social loss function is a special case.
10 However, this observation could also be explained by the fact that Alan Greenspan knew that his
competence exceeded a likely successor’s competence. Thus it is also conceivable that he remained in
office due to welfare considerations.
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among central bankers to emerge. First, central bankers may have different
preferences, e.g., put different emphasis on output stabilization. Second, central
bankers may have different degrees of knowledge concerning the way the economy
works.11
In this paper, we will explore the second avenue and distinguish between highly
efficient and less efficient central bankers.12 A highly efficient central banker will
make more accurate judgments about the magnitude of shocks in the economy. We
assume that the judgment of a highly efficient central banker will be correct with
probability p (1/2 < p ≤ 1) and incorrect with probability 1 − p. The probability
of a correct judgment is the same for all highly efficient central bankers, and its
size is commonly known. Less efficient central bankers are less able to judge the
future course of the economy, and we assume that the probability of their
predicting shocks correctly amounts to 1/2. In other words, a less efficient central
banker does not have any informative indications about the magnitude of shocks.
This is obviously an extreme assumption, but it helps to keep the analysis simple
and is not crucial for our results. The efficiency of each member is private
information.13
We consider a two-period model, with the periods denoted by t = 1 and t = 2.
Overall social losses are given by
L = L1 + δL2. (3)
δ (0 < δ < 1) denotes the discount factor. The subscripts denote the period.
Accordingly, a central banker’s losses amount to
LC B = (L1 − B1) + δ(L2 − B2). (4)
Monetary policy is in the hands of the council of the central bank, which decides
by majority rule which short-term interest rate will be set. The sequence of events is
as follows:
• 1st period
– At the beginning of the first period the council is formed. There is equal prob-
ability of any member being highly efficient or less so.
– Highly efficient central bankers observe a signal indicating the magnitude of
the shock.
– Members decide whether to play an active role or a passive role in decision-
making.
– All members who have chosen to play an active role vote for their preferred
11 The heterogeneity could also be caused by otherwise identical central bankers belonging to different
generations. A model of overlapping generations of central bankers is examined in Sibert (2003).
12 An analysis of the first case is undertaken in Gersbach and Hahn (2004).
13 The issue of whether agents know their own ability has been debated in the literature on career concerns
by experts. Since central bankers are senior experts, it is plausible to assume that central bankers know their
type.
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interest rate i simultaneously. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that only
two choices are possible, corresponding to the two possible realizations of I ∗t .14
– All remaining members are informed about the decisions of their more active
colleagues and vote afterwards.
– The interest rate preferred by the majority is set by the central bank.
– The shock materializes and is observed by the central bankers and the govern-
ment.
– The complete history of the decision-making process is either published under
a transparency requirement or remains secret for all outsiders under opacity.
• 2nd period
– At the beginning of the second period, the (re-)appointment of the members of
the central-bank council takes place. The government can dismiss any central
banker and replace him by another central banker from a pool of candidates.
The probability of newly appointed central bankers being highly efficient is
1/2.
– The rest of the second period is identical to the first period.
This model of decision-making imposes the restriction that active central bankers
cannot change their views, i.e. they cannot vote differently after having observed the
votes of the other active members. Under opacity, we will see that, in equilibrium,
a highly efficient central banker will believe that he chose the wrong interest rate
if he observes that a majority of votes is in favor of the other interest rate. How-
ever, allowing the active central bankers to change their votes in this case would
not affect the outcome of votes and social losses, since they would simply vote for
the interest rate that would be adopted anyhow. Under transparency, changing one’s
vote may not be beneficial for active central bankers in equilibrium, as the gov-
ernment will evaluate the competency of central bankers on the basis of their first
votes.
Moreover, one has to keep in mind that one council meeting in our model
corresponds to a whole term in office and should be interpreted as a representative
meeting. Changing one’s mind may be acceptable occasionally, but someone who
changes his mind very often would probably arouse concern about his competence
and thus may not be re-appointed. Such considerations should prevent central bankers
from changing their opinion frequently, in particular under transparency.
In the following, we describe a behavior that leads to maximal probability of the
correct interest rate being chosen. Let O PT be the following behavior of central
bankers: Each highly efficient central banker plays an active role and chooses the
interest rate supported by his signal. Less efficient central bankers play a passive role
and vote in accordance with the majority of their more active colleagues. If the highly
efficient central bankers reach a draw, the less efficient central bankers randomize15
14 It is obvious that more interest rates are possible in reality. We implicitly assume here that each time
a decision has to be taken only two candidate interest rates are potentially appropriate, e.g., leaving the
interest rate unchanged or lowering it by 25 basis points.
15 While it may seem unrealistic for central bankers to make random decisions by, e.g., casting dice,
randomizing in our model should simply be interpreted as decisions that are not based on knowledge or
judgment and are thus unpredictable.
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between the two possible interest-rate decisions with equal probability. O PT has the
following feature:
Proposition 1 If all central bankers vote according to O PT , then the council achieves
the highest possible probability for a correct interest rate.
Proof Consider a social planner who wants to choose the interest rate that has the
highest probability of being correct. The social planner would choose the interest rate
that a majority of informative signals indicates to be correct. He would be indiffer-
ent if there were a split between the number of informative signals supporting one
or the other interest rate. Therefore O PT realizes a socially optimal interest-rate
decision.16 unionsq
3 Assumptions about re-appointment schemes
In this section, we assume some plausible features of the government’s re-appointment
procedure. Later we will see that equilibria exist that satisfy these assumptions.
3.1 Opacity
In the absence of transparency, the government will either fire the whole council or
leave them in office, since the government does not know how each single central
banker contributed to the decision. In the following we will use µOI,X (X ∈ {C, W }) to
denote the probability of the council being re-appointed if I is correct and the council
has voted for the correct interest rate (C) or wrong interest rate (W ) respectively.
Formally, our assumptions about re-appointment schemes under opacity can be
stated as
µOI,C ≥ µOI,W ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}, (5)
µO+1,X = µO−1,X ∀X ∈ {C, W }. (6)
In the following we will refer to these assumptions as AO . Intuitively, we assume that
the probability of re-appointment is weakly higher for a council that has
identified the correct interest rate rather than the wrong interest rate. Moreover, we con-
sider symmetric re-appointment schemes. The intuition for this is that asymmetric re-
appointment schemes may lead to equilibria where all central bankers always make the
same decision and, in particular, highly efficient central bankers ignore their signals.
3.2 Transparency
For the formulation of the re-appointment scheme under transparency we introduce
V ∈ {−1,+1, P}N as the pattern of votes after the first stage of the voting, where
16 We note that O PT is not the only voting behavior that maximizes the probability of a correct outcome.
We will take up this issue again in Sect. 4.1.
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+1 or −1 stand for an active role and a vote +1 or −1; P denotes a passive role of
the respective committee member. Passive members will update their beliefs about
the optimal interest rate after observing V . Moreover, under transparency the gov-
ernment’s estimate of the probability of a specified passive member being correct
also depends on V , which in turn implies that the re-appointment probability of
passive members may also depend on V . We will call V inconclusive for a cer-
tain committee member if he does not gain information about the optimal interest
rate from observing V .17 In other words, if committee member i is less efficient
and passive and observes an inconclusive V , his posterior estimates about I ∗t =
+1 and I ∗t = −1 being correct correspond to the respective prior probabilities of
1/2.
We now introduce the probability of re-appointment for a central banker who has
played an active role (A) and has voted for the correct interest rate. This probability
is denoted by µTI,C,A under transparency if the correct interest rate is I . Similarly,
µTI,W,A is the probability of re-appointment if I is correct but an active central banker
has voted for the wrong interest rate. In addition, we use µTI,X,P (V ) (X ∈ {C, W }) to
denote the respective probabilities for a passive role (P), given the voting pattern V
after the first stage of the voting.
Next we formally state some plausible assumptions about the re-appointment
scheme under transparency (henceforth AT ) as follows:
µTI,C,A ≥ µTI,W,A ∀I ∈ {−1,+1} (7)
µT+1,X,A = µT−1,X,A ∀X ∈ {C, W } (8)
µTI,C,P (V ) ≥ µTI,W,P (V ) ∀I ∈ {−1,+1} and inconclusive V (9)
µT+1,X,P (V ) = µT−1,X,P (V ) ∀X ∈ {C, W } and inconclusive V (10)
Under transparency, we assume that the government is more likely to re-appoint an
active central banker if he has voted for the correct interest rate rather than the wrong
interest rate. Moreover, we assume that the government’s re-appointment scheme is
symmetric for active central bankers. We also make similar assumptions for passive
central bankers and inconclusive voting patterns.
Note that we do not exclude the possibility of different re-appointment probabili-
ties for different central bankers, although we do not explicitly introduce an index for
individual central bankers.
A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of monetary policy votes in the
first and second period and the re-appointment scheme. Since first-period equilibrium
monetary-policy votes are independent of second-period votes, we can examine the
first period before analyzing the second.
17 Whether or not V is inconclusive for committee member i obviously depends on the strategies chosen
by the other members.
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4 The first period
4.1 Opacity
Under opacity, the voting behavior in the first period is not unique, which is a typical
phenomenon in voting games. For example, if all central bankers always vote for +1,
no central banker has an incentive to deviate, even if he is highly efficient, his signal is
very accurate (p = 1), and it indicates that −1 is correct. The reason is that he cannot
influence the voting outcome. In a similar vein, the voting behavior is not unique in
the second period either under opacity or under transparency.
Hence we consider only perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the overall game where,
given the government’s re-appointment scheme, no profitable joint deviation exists
for all central bankers at each voting stage. Thus we assume that central bankers
can coordinate on a behavior that, given a government’s re-appointment scheme
satisfying AO , guarantees the maximum likelihood of re-appointment. Given a con-
stant probability of re-appointment, central bankers maximize the probability of a
beneficial outcome in the first period. Note that there is no conflict of interest between
the council members, i.e., all central bankers want to achieve high re-appointment
probability and the high probability of a beneficial outcome. Thus, under opacity
in particular, where central bankers can talk in private, it seems plausible that cen-
tral bankers will be able to avoid voting behavior that is harmful to every one of
them.
Our assumption is related to the concepts of coalition-proofness and strong Nash
equilibrium (see Bernheim et al. 1987; Aumann 1959). However, we only consider
joint deviations of all central bankers as opposed to deviations of arbitrary groups
of players.18 The same concept has been applied by Genicot and Ray (2006), who
consider a principal-agent model where the agents are allowed to coordinate on joint
deviations.
Following Proposition 1, all central bankers may choose behavior O PT if the
government applies a re-appointment scheme that satisfies AO . We summarize this
observation in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider opacity in the first period and a re-appointment scheme that
satisfies assumptions AO. Then behavior O PT maximizes the probability of the
council being re-appointed. Moreover, if the probability of re-appointment does not
depend on the behavior of central bankers (µOI,C = µOI,W ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}), central
bankers maximize the likelihood of beneficial monetary policy by choosing O PT .
No individual central banker has an incentive to deviate if all central bankers follow
O PT .
We note that the behavior maximizing the likelihood of beneficial policy outcome
is not unique. However, the alternative behaviors maximizing the likelihood of the
correct interest rate being chosen differ from O PT only in the probabilities of the
less efficient central bankers choosing −1 and +1 in the case of a draw among their
18 Because the interests of all central bankers are aligned, no subset of central bankers can profitably deviate
if the joint group of all central bankers cannot.
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highly efficient colleagues. Obviously, our assumption that O PT is chosen does not
affect our findings about welfare in the first period. Nor does it affect our findings
about welfare in the second period, because it can be shown that these alternative
behaviors would either lead to the same re-appointment procedure as the one in the
equilibrium we consider, or would lead to a contradiction because the optimal re-
appointment scheme would violate assumption (5). In a similar vein, the behavior of
central bankers in the second period will not be unique, even if central bankers are able
to coordinate on a behavior that maximizes welfare. However, all behaviors lead to
identical social losses. Consequently, we assume in the following that the coordination
of central bankers always leads to O PT .
All that remains is to derive the government’s re-appointment scheme.
Proposition 3 If all central bankers choose O PT in the first period under opacity,
then the optimal re-appointment scheme is given by
µO+1,C = µO−1,C = 1 (11)
µO+1,W = µO−1,W = 0 (12)
Proposition 3 follows directly from the observation that the probability of a council
choosing the correct interest rate in the second period is strictly higher for a coun-
cil that has chosen the correct interest rate in the first period as opposed to a newly
appointed council. Thus the government strictly prefers to re-appoint any central-bank
council that has chosen the correct interest rate. For similar reasons, the government
strictly prefers to dismiss a council that has chosen the wrong interest rate in the first
period.
We next derive equilibrium social losses under opacity. In the following, we use
n to denote the number of highly efficient members. Recall that, at first, n is known
neither to the central bankers nor to the government. According to Proposition 2 the
less efficient central bankers simply follow the majority. Consequently, they will not
affect the outcome of the decision-making process. Hence the probability of the major-
ity of central bankers estimating the direction of the shock correctly is equal to the
probability that the estimate of at least (n + 1)/2 efficient central bankers is correct,
which is given by
P(n) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
n∑
i=(n+1)/2
(
n
i
)
pi (1 − p)n−i if n odd
n∑
i=n/2+1
(
n
i
)
pi (1 − p)n−i + 1
2
(
n
n/2
)
pn/2(1 − p)n/2 if n even.
(13)
The last term of P(n) for an even value of n gives the probability of a correct direction
of the interest rate in the case of a draw. There will be randomization between the two
choices, reflected by the factor 1/2.
We note that P(n) is weakly increasing in n for the following reasons. It is straight-
forward to show that P(n + 1) = P(n) if n is odd. Intuitively, an increase in the
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number of highly efficient central bankers by one when n is odd produces more ties
and more correct judgments of the interest-rate policy by the majority. The two effects
cancel each other out. Moreover, the fact that P(n + 1) > P(n) for an even number
of n follows from the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which goes back to Condorcet (1995,
1785).19
It is useful to define
P = 1
2N
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
P(n), (14)
which is the probability that an outside observer assigns to the eventuality of the
majority of central bankers voting correctly.
With the use of P , expected losses in the first period, denoted by L O1 , are given by
L O1 = 1 − P .
L O1 depends negatively on p since, if p increases, the probability that the council
vote is correct will also increase.
4.2 Transparency
To gain some intuition about the equilibrium under transparency, suppose that highly
efficient central bankers behave in the same manner as under opacity. Then less effi-
cient central bankers will not play a passive role in decision-making. The government
would observe who does not actively participate in the decision-making process and
would dismiss the respective members to improve the pool of highly efficient cen-
tral bankers. Therefore less efficient central bankers will be active, and as they are
unwilling to listen to the statements made by their more proficient colleagues they
will randomize between the two possible interest rates in order to have a 50% chance
of not being detected as less efficient. Compared to the case without transparency,
this effect will increase social losses in the first period, since the probability that the
outcome is optimal will decrease.
In the following, we focus on an equilibrium where all central bankers play an
active role. We show that only one equilibrium with this feature exists and that this
equilibrium implies lower welfare than the equilibrium under opacity. In addition,
in the appendix we argue that, if we restrict our attention to equilibria where less
efficient central bankers do not randomize between an active role and a passive role,
no equilibrium exists under transparency that implies higher welfare compared to the
equilibrium where all players play an active role.20
Let us now assume that every central banker chooses an active role. Our assumptions
AT imply that all highly efficient central bankers strictly prefer to vote in line with
19 For a formal presentation, see, e.g., Boland (1989).
20 We conjecture that the main result also holds if we allow for randomization of less efficient central
bankers between a passive and an active role. However, the respective analysis would be very tedious.
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their signals, because for all signals s ∈ {−1;+1}
pµT+s,C,A + (1 − p)µT−s,W,A ≥ (1 − p)µT−s,C,A + pµT+s,W,A (15)
is fulfilled.21 Every less efficient central banker i is active and chooses +1 with some
probability σi and −1 with a probability of 1 − σi . In the following proposition we
determine the values for σi :
Proposition 4 The only values for σi that are compatible with assumptions AT and
an equilibrium where all central bankers are active are σi = 12 ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N }.
The proof is given in the appendix. The following proposition determines the gov-
ernment’s optimal re-appointment scheme:
Proposition 5 Suppose that AT holds and that all central bankers play an active role.
Then any re-appointment scheme under transparency has the following properties:
µT−1,C,A = µT+1,C,A = 1 (16)
µT−1,W,A = µT+1,W,A = 0 (17)
Hence a central banker is re-appointed if and only if he has chosen the correct interest
rate. The proof is given in the appendix.
In order to derive expected losses, we will first define the probability, denoted by
Q, that if each member has a 50% chance of being highly efficient the majority will
choose the correct interest rate.
We can write Q in a convenient way:
Q =
N∑
i=(N+1)/2
(
N
i
)(
1
2
(
p + 1
2
))i (
1 − 1
2
(
p + 1
2
))N−i
, (18)
where we take account of the fact that each central banker casts a correct vote with
probability 12
(
p + 12
)
, because the probability of an individual central banker being
highly efficient and casting a correct vote amounts to 12 · p, and the probability of a
central banker being less efficient and casting a correct vote amounts to 12 · 12 . With
this definition we immediately obtain expected losses in the first period as
LT1 = 1 − Q. (19)
4.3 Comparison
We compare first-period losses with the following proposition:
21 If condition (15) holds with equality, highly efficient central bankers will strictly prefer to choose the
vote suggested by their signal, because this behavior minimizes social losses.
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Proposition 6 Losses in the first period are always larger under transparency than
under opacity.
The proof is straightforward from the observation that behavior in the first period
under transparency does not implement the optimal solution, which is detailed in the
proof of Proposition 1.
This result is quite plausible. Under transparency, no less efficient central banker
will dare to play a more passive role to find out the opinions of his more able colleagues,
since he would not be re-appointed if he did. This will induce less efficient central
bankers to play an active role and randomize between the two possible positions. The
probability of a correct decision being reached will decrease accordingly.
5 The second period
5.1 Opacity
In the second period multiple equilibria also exist. However, as in the first period,
we assume that central bankers coordinate on behavior that guarantees the maximal
probability of a beneficial outcome. We summarize this observation by the following
proposition:
Proposition 7 Under opacity, the following perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists
in the voting game of the second period. All central bankers follow O PT .
To derive expected losses, we need to compute the likelihood of n central bankers
being competent in the second period. This probability is given by
ρON (n) =
1
2N
(
N
n
)
P(n) + (1 − P) 1
2N
(
N
n
)
. (20)
Note that the first term is the probability that there are n highly efficient members
on the original council and that, because they chose the right monetary policy, they
will not be replaced. The second term corresponds to the probability of the original
council being dismissed and the newly formed council having n highly efficient central
bankers.
Expected losses under opacity in the second period can now be written as
L O2 =
N∑
n=0
ρON (n)
(
1 − P(n)). (21)
5.2 Transparency
Again we assume that central bankers coordinate on the behavior that guarantees the
maximal probability of a correct interest-rate decision. Thus we obtain
Proposition 8 In the second period, under transparency, the following perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the voting game exists. All central bankers follow O PT .
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Then in the second period, the equilibrium losses under transparency will be
the same as under opacity for a given number of highly efficient central bankers.
Less efficient central bankers will play a passive role and follow their more
active colleagues because they will gain no benefit from making the government
believe that they are highly efficient but would exacerbate social losses if they voted
in the first stage of the decision-making process. However, the probability that n
central bankers will be highly efficient in the second period is different under
transparency, thus changing expected losses over and against opacity. In the second
period, expected losses will be smaller under transparency since the average number
of highly efficient central bankers will be larger. This is due to the fact that, when
each central banker can be made accountable for his policy preferences, the
government is better able to distinguish highly efficient from less efficient central
bankers.
If we define ρTN (n) as the probability of n highly efficient central bankers being
present in the second period, expected losses can be written as
LT2 =
N∑
n=0
ρTN (n)
(
1 − P(n)). (22)
To determine ρTN (n), we will first derive ρT1 (0) and ρT1 (1). According to Fig. 1, the
probability of a single central banker being highly efficient in the second
period is made up of three factors. First, nature determines whether a central banker is
highly efficient in the first period. Second, re-appointment takes place. Third, nature
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determines whether a newly appointed central banker is highly efficient or not. We
obtain the following expression:
ρT1 (1) =
1
2
· p · 1 + 1
2
· (1 − p) · 1
2
+ 1
2
· 1
2
· 1
2
(23)
= 1
4
p + 3
8
(24)
It is now easy to derive ρT1 (0):
ρT1 (0) = 1 − ρT1 (1) (25)
= −1
4
p + 5
8
(26)
For p = 1/2 we obtain ρT1 (0) = ρT1 (1) = 1/2, which is plausible since, for p = 1/2,
both types are indistinguishable and thus occur with equal probability. Having deter-
mined ρT1 (0) and ρT1 (1), we can construct ρTN (n) by observing that the probability of
a single central banker being highly efficient in the second period depends neither on
the total number of central bankers N nor on the number of highly efficient central
bankers n. We thus obtain the binomial expression
ρTN (n) =
(
N
n
)(
ρT1 (1)
)n(
ρT1 (0)
)N−n
. (27)
5.3 Comparison
We compare social losses in the second period using the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Losses in the second period are always smaller under transparency.
Proof By comparing ρTN (n) and ρON (n) it can be shown that the distribution of compe-
tent central bankers in the second period under transparency first-order stochastically
dominates the respective distribution under opacity. While this is more or less obvi-
ous, because governments can distinguish the competence of central bankers more
easily under transparency, we have not been able to adopt a formal proof. Our numer-
ical simulations, however, show that first-order stochastic dominance holds for all
N < 50 and 0.5 < p < 1. Since P(n) is (weakly) increasing in n, we obtain∑N
n=0 ρTN (n)P(n) >
∑N
n=0 ρON (n)P(n), i.e., the probability of good monetary policy
in the second period is higher under transparency than under opacity. This immediately
implies that second-period social losses are higher under opacity. unionsq
Since transparency makes the re-appointment process more efficient, there are
usually more highly efficient central bankers in the second period under transpar-
ency than under opacity. Consequently, more highly efficient central bankers increase
the likelihood of a good decision, which lowers social losses under transparency.
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opacity
It may be interesting to compare ρTN (n) and ρ
O
N (n) for a specific example. Figure 2
shows these probabilities for N = 13 and p = 0.6. Figure 3 shows the respective
c.d.f.’s. It is clear that first-order stochastic dominance holds in this case. It is also
important to note that while transparency usually guarantees more highly efficient
central bankers in the second period, the effect is not very large.
6 Overall comparison
So far, we have established that under opacity losses are lower in the first period and
larger in the second. Thus the final step is to compare overall losses. While it is hard
to compare losses analytically, due to the complexity of the respective expressions,
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the terms can be calculated numerically for any probability p and any number of
central-bank council members N . As an example, Fig. 4 shows social losses for both
periods and under both scenarios as a function of N for the parameter p = 0.8.
Losses always decrease when N increases, as the likelihood becomes greater that the
central bank will take correct decisions. We also see that under each scenario losses are
smaller in the second period compared to the first period because under both scenarios
the average number of highly efficient central bankers is larger in the second period.
A larger average number of highly efficient central bankers also lowers second-period
losses under transparency compared to second-period losses under opacity. However,
first-period losses under transparency are comparatively large, since fewer efficient
members actively partake in decision making. For N = 1 it does not matter whether
we consider transparency or opacity. Therefore social losses under both scenarios are
always identical for N = 1.
Since the above pattern holds for different values of p, we summarize our main
comparison as follows:
Numerical finding 1 If N > 1, overall expected losses are always larger under
transparency, no matter how large the discount rate δ, 0 < δ < 1.
This result is supported by our numerical analysis but the expressions are so
complex that no analytical proof is available. While transparency always reduces
second period losses, it always increases first period losses. It is not clear a priori
which effect will dominate. However, our numerical computations indicate that for
any p > 1/2 and N > 1 the absolute value of the difference in first-period losses
always exceeds the absolute value of the difference in second-period losses.
Therefore we can conclude that overall expected losses are always larger under
transparency, independently of the parameter δ.
To provide intuition for our results, we start with the two effects of transparency.
First, transparency distorts the behavior of less efficient central bankers who want to
be re-appointed. This is socially detrimental. Second, transparency makes it easier to
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identify and re-appoint highly efficient central bankers. This increases welfare over
time. However, it is much less obvious why (and under what circumstances) the first
effect has a stronger impact on welfare than the second.
The beneficial impact of transparency is weakened by three factors. First, under
transparency highly efficient central bankers may also be dismissed if their signals are
wrong. Second, less efficient central bankers have a 50% chance of not being detected
and thus being re-appointed. Third, even if a central banker’s low level of efficiency is
revealed under transparency, there is a 50% chance of his being replaced by another
less efficient central banker. Moreover, the council can be dismissed under opacity,
which in this case also increases the expected number of highly efficient central bank-
ers over time. On balance, the advantages of transparency are not sufficient to outweigh
the costs created by the signaling incentives for less efficient central bankers.
To provide deeper intuition, the following thought-experiment reveals that the sec-
ond and third factors alone have a sufficiently detrimental impact on the beneficial
effect of transparency to make opacity preferable. The thought-experiment runs as
follows: We consider a less efficient individual central banker in the first period of the
game. Suppose that all other central bankers behave as under opacity and that they are
always re-appointed. Suppose that the government can choose between two options
concerning the behavior of the less efficient central banker under consideration:
(o) The central banker behaves as under opacity in the first period and is always
re-appointed.
(t) The central banker behaves as under transparency in the first period and is always
replaced by a successor whose probability of being highly efficient is 1/2.
This thought-experiment captures the basic trade-off identified in our paper. In the
following, we assume that the discount factor is δ = 1, which favors transparency.
Now let us define H−1 (H+1) as the probability of the highly efficient council mem-
bers voting for the wrong (correct) interest rate with a majority of one vote. Similarly,
let H0 be the probability of the highly efficient council members reaching a draw. These
three cases are crucial, as they imply that the vote of the central banker under con-
sideration actually matters. Note that these probabilities are identical in both periods,
because in our thought-experiment all other central bankers are always re-appointed.
Behavior (t) creates a reduction in the probability of a beneficial outcome in the
first period. This reduction is given by
−H−1 ·
(
1
2
· 1
2
)
+ H0 ·
(
1
2
− 1
2
)
+ H+1 ·
(
1
2
· 1
2
)
. (28)
For example, the term −H−1 ·
( 1
2 · 12
)
refers to the case where the rest of the central
bankers votes for the wrong interest rate by a majority of one vote. If the central banker
under consideration randomizes between both interest rates, he will choose the correct
rate with a probability of 1/2. Then a draw is reached, and the correct interest rate
is chosen with a probability of 1/2. The sign “−” represents the fact that this effect
increases the probability of a correct outcome.
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In an analogous manner we can derive the increase in the probability of a beneficial
outcome in the second period as
H−1 ·
(
1
2
· p · 1
2
)
+ H0 · 12 ·
(
p − 1
2
)
− H+1 · 12 · (1 − p) ·
1
2
. (29)
The government prefers (o) to (t) if (28) is larger than (29). This can be restated as
(2 − p)H+1 > (1 + p)H−1 + (2p − 1)H0. (30)
Interestingly, it is straightforward to derive
H+1 = p1 − p H−1. (31)
Intuitively, the difference between case +1 and case −1 is that one highly efficient
committee members switches from a correct vote to a wrong vote. The relative prob-
ability of an individual member voting for the correct vote as opposed to the wrong
vote is p1−p .
Using (31), we can simplify (30) as follows:
H+1 > pH0 (32)
Inequality (32) holds if H+1 > H0, which means that a small majority for the correct
interest rate is more likely than a draw. This condition holds intuitively (highly effi-
cient central bankers are more likely to vote for the correct interest rate than the wrong
interest rate) and can also be verified analytically. To sum up, a government that can
choose between behaviors (t) and (o) of an individual central banker will choose (o).
Thus in our thought-experiment the distortion in the first period is more significant
than the positive effect induced by the dismissal of a less efficient member in the
second period.
The comparison in our paper is more complicated than in our thought-experiment
as the council can be dismissed under opacity and highly efficient central bankers
may be dismissed accidentally under transparency. Moreover, less efficient central
bankers may remain undetected and thus be re-appointed. These effects, however,
tend to strengthen the social value of opacity over transparency.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have identified the costs and benefits of voting transparency,
concluding that the costs may be large enough to justify opacity. This conclusion is not
restricted to central-bank councils; it could also be applied to other committees con-
sisting of members with different degrees of competence, identical utility functions,
and the desire to be re-appointed due to the large private benefits this implies.
The disadvantage of transparency in our model stems from the signaling incentives
of less efficient central bankers, which has broad parallels in other economic areas,
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notably in signaling games (see e.g. Kreps and Sobel 1994). Transparency, though,
has the advantage of revealing inefficiencies more successfully than opacity.
Our finding that opacity is superior to transparency extends to a model where the
prior probabilities for I ∗ = −1 and I ∗ = +1 are different. In this case, the possibility
of re-appointment may induce a small distortion to the behavior of less efficient central
bankers even under opacity. However, this distortion is not strong enough to reverse
our finding about higher social losses under transparency.22
It is interesting to ask why the government does not limit the term in office for
central bankers to one period under transparency. Then there would be no need for
less efficient central bankers to randomize, which would yield lower losses. This re-
appointment behavior, however, would not be time-consistent, as it is ex-post optimal
in the beginning of the second period to re-appoint central bankers who have voted
for the correct interest rate. If it is possible to eliminate the possibility of re-appoint-
ment, it is beneficial to do so. Introducing only one, possibly very long term in office
destroys the possibility of re-appointing central bankers who have shown desirable
voting behavior. More importantly, however, it induces less efficient central bankers
to behave in a socially optimal way and to refrain from socially inefficient attempts to
get re-appointed. Under opacity, it is optimal if the council can always be re-appointed
as many times as possible. This enables successful councils to be left in office for many
periods.
It may also be interesting to explore from an ex ante point of view whether cen-
tral bankers would prefer transparency to opacity. Our model suggests the following:
Under transparency, less efficient central bankers have a probability of one half of
getting re-appointed. Under opacity, the probability of getting re-appointed is higher.
Therefore incompetent central bankers prefer opacity to transparency. A similar argu-
ment holds for highly efficient central bankers. Thus from an ex ante point of view
both less efficient central bankers and highly efficient central bankers prefer opacity
to transparency. This implication of our model may explain why central bankers are
sometimes reluctant to impose transparency on monetary policy.
We have simplified our model by assuming that only one decision is made during
one term of central bankers. Thus the decision stage in our model should be inter-
preted as a representative decision taken during one term. However, it seems plausible
that this simplification should not affect the basic factors identified in our model,
namely that transparency enables the government to identify competent individuals
more easily, while creating more incentives for central bankers to appear as competent
individuals.
One prediction of our model is that transparency leads to more controversial vot-
ing in central bank councils, as somewhat less competent central bankers play a more
active role in the decision-making process.23 In principle, this could be verified empir-
ically if one assumes that, where voting records are published with substantial delay,
central bankers act as if voting records remain secret. The claim by ECB Council
Members that decisions are taken by consensus may offer some anecdotal evidence
22 Since the analysis of this case is very lengthy, we do not give the proof here. It is available upon request.
23 Cf. also Stasavage (2007), who shows that transparency may lead to greater polarization of opinions
when decision-makers are subject to lobbying.
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that opacity can lead to less controversial voting because somewhat less competent
central bankers play a more passive role and follow the majority.
Of course, we do not claim that the model in this paper captures all aspects
of voting transparency. For example, “on-the-job-learning” may be important for
central bankers, which might make it less likely for central bankers to be replaced
for lack of competence. Transparency may also increase central bankers’ efforts to
acquire information. In Gersbach and Hahn (2004), we show that our findings might
be reversed if differences in preferences are crucial. It is also conceivable that central
bankers would circumvent a transparency requirement by meeting in secret before the
official meeting.24 Nevertheless, we believe that our model provides an interesting
example of an effect that is often overlooked, i.e. that transparency may alter the
incentives of decision-makers in monetary policy committees by creating a con-
flict between socially desirable and individually optimal behavior. This may well
distort policy decisions in an unfavorable way. Hence, we find some support for
the fear expressed by central bankers that transparency may hamper open-minded
discussion between council members and thus render monetary policy-making less
efficient.
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Appendix A: Analysis of potential additional equilibria under transparency
In this appendix we present the reasoning why any other potential equilibrium that
satisfies AT and where passive committee members do not randomize between an
active and a passive role implies higher social losses than the equilibrium where all
committee members always play an active role. In a first step, we show that committee
member i either always plays an active role or he plays a passive role irrespective of
his efficiency. In the second step, we describe the behavior of a committee member
who is always active. In the third step, we describe the behavior of a member who is
always passive. In the fourth step, we argue that, if there were additional equilibria
that satisfied the restrictions mentioned before, they would imply lower welfare than
the equilibrium we propose.
A.1 Active role versus passive role
First, we consider a particular member i who always plays a passive role if he is less
efficient. In the following we argue that i must also be passive if he is highly efficient.
24 This poses the question of whether transparency would be feasible. Our perspective is designed to answer
the question whether transparency is desirable in principle.
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Assume for contrast that, in an equilibrium, member i will choose an active role
with positive probability if he is highly efficient and receives a particular signal s.
Then the government would re-appoint member i with certainty whenever he is active
and chooses s, because this behavior would reveal high efficiency. By mimicking this
behavior, a less efficient committee member could ensure definite re-appointment.
We argue next that member i cannot ensure definite re-appointment by playing
a passive role. The fact that member i is always passive if he is less efficient, but
that there is a positive probability of his being active, implies that member i is more
likely to be less efficient than highly efficient if he is passive. Hence there is at least
one combination of an interest-rate choice I ∈ {−1,+1}, the correctness of the vote
(C or W ), and a voting pattern V which causes this combination to be chosen less
frequently by highly efficient committee members than less efficient committee mem-
bers. For this combination, the government knows that the likelihood of a member i
who displays these characteristics being highly efficient is lower than the likelihood
of a newly appointed central banker being highly efficient. Hence this combination is
associated with zero re-appointment probability. This implies that it would be opti-
mal for a less efficient member threatened by this combination to play an active role,
because this means definite re-appointment. This produces a contradiction. Hence we
arrive at the conclusion that committee member i is always passive if he is highly
efficient.
Second, we assume that i always plays an active role if he is less efficient. It is
straightforward to show that the consequence of this is that i must also play an active
role in any equilibrium if he is highly efficient.
To sum up, committee member i is either passive for high and less high efficiency
or active for both levels of efficiency.
A.2 Member i is always active
First we consider the case where committee member i is active and highly efficient.
If (7) holds strictly, then he always follows his signal. If (7) holds with equality, then
this condition alone does not exclude the possibility of i voting against his signal.25
However, we are trying to identify a potential equilibrium with higher welfare than the
equilibrium in the main text. Thus we assume in the following that i always follows
his signal if he is highly efficient and active.
As a consequence, a less efficient member would always choose both options with
equal probability. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 4.
A.3 Member i is always passive
First, assume that the voting pattern V is inconclusive for i . In line with (9) and (10), an
efficient committee member i would follow his private signal. A less efficient member
25 Such equilibria might occur if passive members always cast votes that contradict the votes of their active
colleagues.
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would always choose both options with equal probability. The proof is analogous to
the proof of Proposition 4.
Second, assume that the voting pattern is informative rather than inconclusive. Note
that an inefficient committee member i would never randomize between both options.
If his re-appointment chances did not depend on his interest-rate decision, he would
always choose the interest rate suggested by the voting pattern, because this would
increase welfare. Therefore a less efficient member chooses with certainty either the
interest rate suggested by the voting pattern or the opposite interest rate. Let us use I˜ to
denote this interest rate. In equilibrium, the member will also choose I˜ with certainty
if he is highly efficient.26
A.4 Welfare of potential additional equilibria
In the following we argue that these potential additional equilibria never imply higher
welfare. For this purpose we assume that passive committee members choose the
interest rate suggested by the voting pattern if it is informative rather than inconclusive.
This assumption obviously guarantees higher welfare. Then members behave in the
following ways:
1. Active members behave in the same way as in the equilibrium in the main text.
2. If a member plays a passive role and the voting pattern is inconclusive, he behaves
in the same way as he would behave in the equilibrium in the main text.
3. Passive committee members with an informative voting pattern choose the interest
rate suggested by the voting pattern.
The first two behaviors have no impact on welfare in comparison with the equilibrium
considered in the main text. However, the third type of behavior reduces the probability
of a beneficial outcome. If a member plays a passive role and the voting pattern is
informative rather than inconclusive, then he will always opt for the interest rate
suggested by this voting pattern. Thus the probability of a beneficial outcome is
reduced, as the council effectively decides like a council of a smaller size. Moreover,
the government is less able to identify highly efficient committee members because
highly efficient and less efficient members always choose the same interest rate. This
also decreases welfare compared to the equilibrium where all committee members
choose an active role. unionsq
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
It is plausible (and can be verified later by examining the expressions for welfare in
the second period under transparency) that the government can ensure the maximum
possible welfare in the second period by maximizing the likelihood of high efficiency
for each individual central banker. Consequently, it is optimal to only re-appoint central
26 If this were not the case, the government could distinguish highly efficient from less efficient members
easily and would re-appoint only central bankers who have chosen − I˜ . Then it would always be optimal
for member i to choose − I˜ , and we would obtain a contradiction.
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bankers who are highly efficient with a probability that is higher than the probability
of a newly appointed member being highly efficient. Suppose that highly efficient
central bankers are active and vote in line with their signals. Additionally, suppose
that less efficient central bankers choose +1 and −1 with probabilities σi and 1 − σi
respectively. Then the probability of a central banker being highly efficient, given that
he has voted for the correct (C) or wrong (W ) interest rate, played an active (A) or
passive (P) role and given that +1 or −1 was the correct interest rate, is given by
κT+1,C,A =
p
σi + p (33)
κT+1,W,A =
1 − p
1 − σi + 1 − p (34)
κT−1,C,A =
p
1 − σi + p (35)
κT−1,W,A =
1 − p
σi + 1 − p (36)
Note that, for I ∗ = +1, our assumption (7) can only be fulfilled if κT+1,C,A ≥ κT+1,W,A,
which entails σi ≤ p. Similarly, assumption (7) requires κT−1,C,A ≥ κT−1,W,A for
I ∗ = −1, and thus, in turn, σi ≥ 1 − p. Since 0 < σi < 1, we can conclude that,
in equilibrium, any less efficient central banker must be indifferent between choosing
+1 and −1. Otherwise randomizing would not be optimal.
A less efficient central banker is indifferent with respect to voting for +1 or −1 if
both options entail the same probability of re-appointment and if both options guar-
antee the same probability of a correct outcome in the first period. The first condition
can be stated as
1
2
µT+1,C,A +
1
2
µT−1,W,A =
1
2
µT−1,C,A +
1
2
µT+1,W,A. (37)
The sum on the left-hand side gives the probability of a highly efficient central banker
being re-appointed if he chooses +1. The right-hand side gives the respective proba-
bility for the vote −1.
For the second condition, we need to introduce DI (σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σN ),
which is the probability that there is a draw in the group of all central bankers without
central banker i if the correct interest rate is I and if each highly efficient central
banker votes for the correct interest rate with probability p and each less efficient
central banker votes for +1 with probability σ j . Note that, because of the symmetry of
the problem, a permutation of the arguments of DI does not affect its value. Moreover,
the following condition holds:
D−1(σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σN )
= D+1(1 − σ1, 1 − σ2, . . . , 1 − σi−1, 1 − σi+1, . . . , 1 − σN ) (38)
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The probability of a draw is crucial as central banker i only has an impact on the
outcome of the vote if there is a draw among the rest of the central bankers. The proba-
bility of a beneficial outcome when central banker i chooses +1 equals the respective
probability if the central banker chooses −1. Hence the following equation holds for
each central banker i :
D+1(σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σN ) = D−1(σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σN ),
(39)
which can be reformulated as
D+1(σ1, σ2, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σN )
= D+1(1 − σ1, 1 − σ2, . . . , 1 − σi−1, 1 − σi+1, . . . , 1 − σN ). (40)
It is obvious that σi = 1/2 ∀i = 1 . . . N is a solution to these N equations. However,
it remains to be shown that this solution is unique.
As an example, let us consider the equation for i = 1 and for i = 2.
D+1(σ2, σ3, . . . , σN ) = D+1(1 − σ2, 1 − σ3, . . . , 1 − σN ) (41)
D+1(σ1, σ3, . . . , σN ) = D+1(1 − σ1, 1 − σ3, . . . , 1 − σN ) (42)
We will show later that ∂
∂σ j D+1(σ2, σ3, . . . , σN ) ≤ 0 ∀ j = 2..N . Similarly, ∂∂σ j D+1
(1 − σ2, 1 − σ3, . . . , 1 − σN ) ≥ 0∀ j = 2..N . We will also show that the first inequal-
ity only holds with equality if σi = 1 − p ∀i = 1..N , i = j . Moreover the second
inequality only holds with equality if σi = p ∀i = 1..N , i = j . Consequently, for
each j = 2..N at least one of the inequalities holds strictly.
As a consequence, if Eq. (41) has a solution for σ2, given σ3, σ4, . . . σN , this solu-
tion is unique. Then given σ3, σ4, . . . σN Eq. (42) implies the same unique solution for
σ1. Thus we establish that all σi ’s are identical. Let σ be the respective value. Then
(40) simplifies to
D+1(σ, σ, . . . , σ ) = D+1(1 − σ, 1 − σ, . . . , 1 − σ). (43)
Now we can write
D+1(σ, σ, . . . , σ ) =
(
N − 1
N−1
2
)(
1
2
(p + σ)
) N−1
2
(
1 − 1
2
(p + σ)
) N−1
2
, (44)
where we have taken account of the fact that each individual central banker casts a
correct vote with probability 12 (p + σ), given that +1 is correct. This probability is
the sum of 12 p, which is the probability of a central banker being highly efficient and
casting a correct vote, and 12σ , which is the probability of a central banker being less
efficient and casting a correct vote.
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With (44) Eq. (43) can be stated as
(
1
2
(p + σ)
)(
1 − 1
2
(p + σ)
)
=
(
1
2
(p + 1 − σ)
)(
1 − 1
2
(p + 1 − σ)
)
, (45)
which implies σ = 12 .
We now need to demonstrate our earlier claim that ∂
∂σ j D+1(σ2, σ3, . . . , σN ) ≤ 0
∀ j = 2..N . Note that, given that I ∗ = +1, the probability of an individual central
banker i voting correctly in the first period amounts to γi := 12 (σi + p) with γi ≥ 12(which follows from σi ≥ 1 − p). Let us consider, without loss of generality, j = 2.
We can write
D+1(σ2, σ3, . . . , σN ) = γ2d− + (1−γ2)d+ = 12 (σ2 + p) d−+
(
1− 1
2
(σ2+ p)
)
d+,
(46)
where we have introduced d− (d+) as the probability that, among members i = 3 . . . N ,
a majority of exactly one member will vote for −1 (+1). We obtain
∂
∂σ2
D+1(σ2, σ3, . . . , σN ) = 12 (d− − d+) . (47)
Because γi ≥ 12 , i.e. the probability of each player i = 3, . . . , N voting for +1 is
higher than the respective probability of the player voting for −1, d+ ≥ d− holds,
which implies ∂
∂σ2
D+1(σ2, σ3, . . . , σN ) ≤ 0. The inequality d+ ≥ d− only holds with
equality if σi = 1 − p ∀i = 1..N , i = j , which implies γi = 1/2 ∀i = 1, . . . , N ,
i = j . unionsq
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
In the proof of Proposition 4, we defined the probability of a central banker being
competent. Using this definition and applying σi = 1/2 and p > 12 , we obtain
κT+1,C,A =
p
1
2 + p
>
1
2
(48)
κT+1,W,A =
1 − p
1
2 + 1 − p
<
1
2
(49)
κT−1,C,A =
p
1
2 + p
>
1
2
(50)
κT−1,W,A =
1 − p
1
2 + 1 − p
<
1
2
(51)
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It is only optimal for the government to re-appoint a central banker if he is more
likely to be competent than a newly appointed colleague. Thus we obtain the proposed
re-appointment scheme.
For completeness, we also give the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the government.
If a central banker chooses a passive role and is correct (C) or wrong (W ), and if I
is the optimal interest rate, then the respective probability of a central banker being
highly efficient must satisfy the condition
κTI,X,P < 1/2 ∀I ∈ {−1,+1}, X ∈ {C, W }. (52)
The out-of-equilibrium beliefs κTI,X,P ensure that it is optimal to dismiss any central
banker who has played a passive role.
It is straightforward to verify that the re-appointment scheme satisfies (15) and
(37), which implies that the central bankers behave optimally given the re-appoint-
ment scheme. unionsq
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